It runs:
The difficulty has arisen from our forgetting that contradiction in
terms lies at the foundation of all our thoughts as a condition and
sine qua non of our being able to think at all. We imagine that we
must either have all free-will and no necessity, or all necessity and
no free-will, and, it being obvious that our free-will is often
overridden by force of circumstances while the evidence that
necessity is overridden by free-will is harder to find (if indeed it
can be found, for I have not fully considered the matter), most
people who theorise upon this question will deny in theory that there
is any free-will at all, though in practice they take care to act as
if there was. For if we admit that like causes are followed by like
effects (and everything that we do is based upon this hypothesis), it
follows that every combination of causes must have some one
consequent which can alone follow it and which free-will cannot
touch.
(Yes, but it will generally be found that free-will entered into the
original combination and the repetition of the combination will not
be exact unless a like free-will is repeated along with all the other
factors.)
From which it follows that free-will is apparent only, and that, as I
said years ago in Erewhon, we are not free to choose what seems best
on each occasion but bound to do so, being fettered to the freedom of
our wills throughout our lives.
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