For,
if the substance is eternal and unknowable and unchangeable, it is
tantamount to nothing. Nothing can be nearer non-existence than
eternal unknowableness and unchangeableness.
If, on the other hand, the substance changes, then it is not
unknowable, or uncognisable, for by cognising its changes we cognise
it. Changes are the only things that we can cognise. Besides, we
cannot have substance changing without condition changing, and if we
could we might as well ignore condition. Does it not seem as though,
since the motions or states are all that we cognise, they should be
all that we need take account of? Change of condition is change of
substance. Then what do we want with substance? Why have two ideas
when one will do?
I suppose it has all come about because there are so many tables and
chairs and stones that appear not to be moving, and this gave us the
idea of a solid substance without any motion in it.
How would it be to start with motion approximately patent, and motion
approximately latent (absolute patency and absolute latency being
unattainable), and lay down that motion latent as motion becomes
patent as substance, or matter of chair-and-table order; and that
when patent as motion it is latent as matter and substance?
I am only just recovering from severe influenza and have no doubt I
have been writing nonsense.
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