For
it is possible to use an expression to denote what does not belong
to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong. Thus (e.g.)
'flourishing' is a word which in the form of its expression is like
'cutting' or 'building': yet the one denotes a certain quality-i.e.
a certain condition-while the other denotes a certain action. In the
same manner also in the other instances.
Refutations, then, that depend upon language are drawn from these
common-place rules. Of fallacies, on the other hand, that are
independent of language there are seven kinds:
(1) that which depends upon Accident:
(2) the use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with
some qualification of respect or place, or time, or relation:
(3) that which depends upon ignorance of what 'refutation' is:
(4) that which depends upon the consequent:
(5) that which depends upon assuming the original conclusion:
(6) stating as cause what is not the cause:
(7) the making of more than one question into one.
5
Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any
attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its
accident. For since the same thing has many accidents there is no
necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a
thing's predicates and to their subject as well. Thus (e.g.), 'If
Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he
is a man': or 'If he be different from Socrates, and Socrates be a
man, then', they say, 'he has admitted that Coriscus is different from
a man, because it so happens (accidit) that the person from whom he
said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man'.
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